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Abstract 
This paper investigates long-term home care utilisation in Europe. Data from 
SHARE on formal (nursing care or paid domestic help) and informal care (support 
provided by relatives) are used to study the probability and the quantity of both 
types of care being received. The overall process is framed in a fully simultaneous 
equation system which takes the form of a bivariate two-part model. Endogeneity 
and unobservable heterogeneity are addressed using a common latent factors 
approach. Age, disability and proximity-to-death are found to be important joint 
predictors of home care utilisation. The relationship between formal and informal 
care is small in absolute size and moves from substitutability to complementarity 
depending on the type of formal care considered. 
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1  Introduction  
Over the last decades, European and other developed countries have 
been undergoing a process of population ageing, mainly due to lower 
fertility rates and increased life expectancy and partly driven by advances 
in medicine. For the European Union, the latest Ageing Report of the 
European Commission (2009) foresees an increase, with respect to 2008, 
of 8.5 years in life expectancy at birth for men by 2060 and of 6.9 years 
for women, with a parallel increase in the old-age dependency ratio from 
25.4% to 53.5%. The downside of a longer life expectancy is that public 
and private health care expenditure (HCE) are expected to increase, both 
with the number of elderly people and the average age of the population.  
This is particular cause for concern about the sustainability of national 
welfare and health care systems. The same report estimates a shift in the 
average EU share of public HCE over GDP from 6.8 to 7.8 by 2035 up 
to 8.3 in 2060. Under these scenarios, one of the fastest growing 
components of HCE is long-term care (LTC), with an expected increase 
of 50% between 2008 and 2035 (from 1.2 of GDP to 1.8) and of 100% 
by 2060. 
The reliability of these forecasts crucially depends on the accurateness 
of the estimates of age effects. Since the seminal paper by Zweifel, 
Felder and Meiers (1999), several studies have tried to assess the role of 
individual age on HCE as well as that of competing predictors of 
expenditures. In particular, measures of proximity to death (PtD) appear 
to be better than age at capturing individual health deterioration and the 
fact that, when approaching death, the actual demand for health care 
services increases due to greater health needs rather than age per se. In 
this respect, the simple ageing of the population has been claimed to be a 
“red herring” in the study of the evolution of HCE over time (see 
Stearns and Norton, 2004; Seshamani and Gray, 2004a,b and, for a 
review of the literature, Payne et al., 2007). For LTC expenditure, 
however, the recent literature provides mixed evidence about the relative 
contributions of age and PtD, while it emphasizes a prominent role of 
disability indicators. In an analysis of the components of Swiss HCE, 
Werblow, Felder and Zweifel (2007) find that age matters only for LTC 
expenditures, regardless of individuals’ remaining lifespan, whereas PtD 
is a significant predictor of other types of HCEs. Somewhat similarly, in 
a study based on Dutch data, De Meijer et al. (2011) show that PtD is not 
a good predictor of homecare expenditure when disability indicators are 
taken into account. In this sense, they argue that PtD itself appears to be 
a “red herring”, and conclude that both age and PtD can become 
3 
 
redundant in models that appropriately control for disability. Additional 
insights are offered by studies carried out with US data.  Weaver et al. 
(2009) estimate the marginal effect of PtD on the probability of nursing 
home and of formal home care use and assess its robustness to the 
inclusion of informal care indicators (defined as being married or living 
with an adult child). They find that, overall, PtD increases the likelihood 
of using formal home care and, to a greater extent, nursing homes. When 
considering the role of informal support, however, the impact of PtD 
reduces significantly. On the whole, these studies have generally focused 
only on the main drivers of formal LTC, but have not considered that 
also informal care provided by relatives to the dependent person could 
be seen as a “dependent variable” to be explained in light of the effects 
of age, PtD and disability indicators. 
In analyses of LTC, the primary interest in informal support lies in its 
being relatively interchangeable with formal care. Unlike acute medical 
care, a large part of the care needed is provided at home, not only by 
specialised or licensed personnel (e.g., nurses, carers, therapists) but also, 
and more often, by unpaid caregivers who usually are adult children, 
other relatives or friends of older adults. Often, LTC services do not 
require high level skills or capital equipment.1
                                                 
1 Since these services require low-to-medium skilled personnel, wage 
variability among formal caregivers is low, thus implying that the amount of 
LTC expenditure is essentially determined by the number of hours of care 
provided. 
 This allows, at least in 
principle, for a certain degree of substitutability between professional 
(paid) and informal (unpaid) care. On one hand, support by family and 
friends would be less frequent as more formal care services are available 
to the elderly and the other way round, thus justifying welfare policies 
that ration formal care to contain expenditures. On the other hand, 
informal care may substitute formal care when the decision to provide 
care is conditional to the expectation of inheriting a larger portion of the 
elderly bequest and use of formal care will be considered only as the last 
resort. However, alternative economic explanations, discussed in detail in 
Van Houtven and Norton (2004) and Jiménez-Martín and Prieto (2011), 
support the hypothesis of complementarity in the relationship between 
formal and informal care, particularly for the severely disabled whose 
needs are likely to exceed informal care resources. Generally speaking, 
complementarity may also arise when support from family and friends 
consists of organising the provision of formal care, operating different 
and lower skill tasks relative to professional carers, or even replacing 
them in some occasions (e.g. to grant them a day off). 
4 
 
Most empirical studies find that informal care is a substitute for 
formal care. For example, Van Houtven and Norton (2004) find that 
care giving by one’s children substitutes home care as well as hospital 
care and physician visits and also reduces nursing home admissions; 
however, conversely, it is a complement to outpatient surgery. Van 
Houtven and Norton (2008) show that care provided by adult children is 
a net substitute for Medicare LTC expenditure of the single elderly, 
significantly reducing the likelihood of incurring expenditure for home 
care. Such informal support is less effective among elderly couples. 
Using data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), Bolin, Lindgren, and Lundborg (2008) find evidence of 
substitutability between informal care and home care (nursing care and 
paid domestic help) whilst some complementary effect is found between 
informal care and doctor and hospital visits. In a research work on the 
same data, Bonsang (2009) confirms the substitution effect between 
informal and formal care, and finds that the effect disappears for the 
elderly suffering from severe disabilities.2
In this paper we propose a unified framework for the study of LTC. 
On the one hand, the impact of informal care is assessed in comparison 
to other drivers of formal home care use. On the other hand, the analysis 
is extended to investigate the determinants of informal support. This 
requires appropriate empirical modelling. Previous works have usually 
estimated recursive models for formal care, that take into account 
potential endogeneity of informal care, and are identified by means of 
instrumental variables approaches. This does not provide, in our 
opinion, a complete view of the relationship between formal and 
informal care, and does not fully account for simultaneity in the 
processes that determine the presence and the amount of both types of 
LTC. We claim that structural equations for informal care should also be 
estimated, where formal care is included as an endogenous explanatory 
variable, jointly with the structural equations for formal care. We 
therefore propose a fully simultaneous system of four equations which 
models both the likelihood as well as the number of hours of both 
formal and informal care received. This takes the form of a bivariate 
two-part model with correlated errors.  
 Overall, these studies, focused 
on the substitution/complementarity debate, have paid little attention to 
the impact of informal care vis-à-vis the other important determinants of 
LTC use, such as age, PtD and disability. This parallels the little interest 
in informal care in the literature on the drivers of LTC expenditures. 
                                                 
2 Spillman and Pezzin (2000) even find complementarity for this population 
subgroup. 
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Endogeneity in formal and informal care models arises from 
unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity bias. This is a common 
problem to many analyses of health care demand and, in the case of 
LTC, is exacerbated by the use of survey data which often lack 
information on the whole set of LTC determinants. Heterogeneous 
preferences between care recipients and caregivers, the cost of formal 
home care and the availability and cost of nursing home services are 
usually unobserved. Our work contributes to the empirical literature by 
addressing endogeneity arising from unobservable heterogeneity and 
simultaneity bias in a common latent factors framework. In particular, we 
adapt Mroz’s (1999) semiparametric maximum likelihood approach, 
which uses a discrete factor approximation of the unknown distribution 
of heterogeneity, to our bivariate two-part model.  
These issues are addressed using data from the first wave of SHARE 
merged with new information on PtD recovered from the second wave. 
We estimate three separate models of formal care (as measured by total 
formal care, paid domestic help and nursing care) and informal care. This 
enables us to assess the relative role of individual ageing, PtD and 
disability on both formal and informal care in Europe.  
By calculating average partial effects we assess the nature of the 
relationship between formal and informal care and the relative impact of 
age, PtD and disability on both types of care. We further simulate their 
interaction effect for different reference types of individuals. In 
particular, we make comparisons between survivors and decedents, 
youngest and oldest old and individuals in different levels of LTC needs, 
as proxied by disability indicators.  
We find that age, PtD and disability have sizeable explanatory power 
on LTC use. Being severely disabled or an oldest old has the greatest 
impact on formal and informal care use, but no prominent role for any 
specific determinant emerges. Overall, our findings suggest that 
indicators of age, PtD and disability should be jointly included in models 
of LTC. Our results also suggest that the link between formal and 
informal care changes depending on whether nursing care or paid 
domestic help is considered. Complementarity is found in the first case 
whilst substitutability prevails in the latter. Average partial effects are 
however negligible in both cases. Focusing on the size of these effects  
may have important policy implications. Economic incentives aimed at 
encouraging informal support can hardly modify the use of LTC services 
at home.  
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2 Data and key variables  
We use data from the European longitudinal Survey on Health, 
Ageing and Retirement (SHARE), which has been designed after the US 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study 
of Aging (ELSA). The original sample consists of 28,517 non-
institutionalised individuals aged 50 years or older. In our analysis we 
focus on individuals who participated in the first wave (2004) and lived 
in Northern Europe (Denmark and Sweden), Western Europe (Austria, 
France, Germany, Belgium and Netherland) or in the Mediterranean 
Area (Spain and Italy). 
SHARE provides a rich set of information about formal and informal 
care received at home. Formal caregivers have an employment contract 
and can either be paid out-of-pocket or by private or public coverage 
schemes. It is common to distinguish between nursing care (NC), 
typically provided at home by professionals within public or private 
insurance schemes, and paid domestic help (PDH) for cleaning tasks that 
the respondent was unable to do because of health problems, services 
mainly provided by low or unskilled workers, often immigrants, or black 
market workers (see Lippi Bruni and Ugolini, 2006a, b). We use data on 
the number of weeks and hours of formal care received and define two 
continuous variables indicating the average number of hours received 
per month in the last year (hNC and hPDH). Information on these two 
types of formal care is aggregated to build a general indicator for total 
formal care (TFC): a continuous variable for the number of hours 
defined as the combination of NC and PDH that can be received by an 
individual in the same year (hTFC).  
Informal caregivers are usually relatives or friends. An accurate 
quantification of informal care (IC) is problematic because this type of 
LTC is a non-market good. The SHARE questionnaire identifies 
informal care as support received exclusively from family members 
outside the household, and provides information about the nature of the 
relationship between caregivers and recipients, the frequency of support 
(daily, weekly, monthly or annual) and the average number of hours 
received (per day, week, month and year).3
                                                 
3 In the absence of data on actual informal care, indicators of coresidence 
have been often employed (see e.g., Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; De Meijer 
et al., 2011; Weaver et al., 2009). 
 Like most existing literature, 
we consider informal support received from children, grandchildren and 
children-in-law in the last year, and build a continuous variable for the 
average number of hours received per month.  Following Van Houtven 
and Norton (2004), we use observations for respondents aged 65 or 
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older, who have at least one child and up to 4 children, and do not live 
with any of them. Unlike other studies, only individuals living alone are 
considered.4
New information about the living status of respondents was collected 
two years after the interview (i.e., in the second wave of the survey). This 
makes it possible to construct a binary indicator of PtD, which takes 
value 1 if the respondent died within two years of the interview, and 0 
otherwise. Data on PtD cover about 70 per cent of our target sample. 
This leaves us with a sample of 1,337 observations. 
 Due to poor accuracy in the responses, individuals who 
reported having received more than 24 hours of care per day, more than 
168 hours per week, or more than 720 hours per month and more than 
8640 in a year have been eliminated from the sample. Additionally, we 
restrict the analysis to those individuals who have received LTC and also 
report either some mobility limitation or disability, chronic disease or 
long-term illness. This enables us to exclude from the sample those 
individuals who might have received any type of LTC (particularly, paid 
domestic help) for reasons not strictly related with their needs. 
As shown in Table 1, LTC recipients (defined as individuals receiving 
either formal or informal care) represent 47% of respondents receiving 
an average of 50 hours of care per month in the last year. About 44% of 
them received TFC, most of which is PDH (about 80%, against 44% 
NC). On average, the amount of TFC received is around 27 hours per 
month. Looking at the specific types of formal care consider, we find 
that most of the care is PDH, with 26.5 hours per month, while NC 
counts for 14 hours. Informal support appears to be the main source of 
LTC in our sample, roughly 83 % of LTC recipients receiving it. Not 
surprisingly, the amount of informal care largely exceeds TFC, with 
about 46 hours per month for IC recipients.  
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
Table 1 also reports descriptive statistics for standard demographics, 
socioeconomic status and other individual characteristics that will be 
                                                 
4 We think that simply controlling for the presence of cohabiting spouse and 
children cannot be considered a satisfactory way to fill the lack of quantitative 
information on support provided within the household. The downside is that, 
since spouses and children living within the household are known to be the 
most common informal caregivers, IC indicators based on the SHARE data 
might underestimate the actual role of informal caregivers. 
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used in the econometric analysis.5
The survey provides detailed information about morbidity and 
disability. We use indicators of mobility limitations (mobility), limitations 
in usual activities because of health problems (GALI), limitations in 
activities of daily living (ADL), chronic diseases (chronic) and long-term 
illnesses (ltillness).
 Our sample consists of 77.6% women 
and the average age is about 76. The oldest old (over 85) account for 
about 12% of the sample. Around 5.2% died between the first and the 
second wave of SHARE.  
6
Caregivers’ characteristics may determine the availability and the 
quantity of informal support received. We use available information 
about geographical distance between children and their parents.
 Long-term illnesses are represented by dichotomous 
variables taking value 1 for individuals with illnesses, and 0 otherwise. 
The other indicators are expressed in categories that depend on the 
severity level of the disease or limitation. Roughly 54% of the sample 
reports having GALI limitations, 16.6% reports ADL limitations, about 
68% reports limitations in mobility, and 57% reports having long-term 
illnesses.  
7
                                                 
5 We use an indicator of years of education based on the international 
standard classification of Education 1997 (ISCED-97), which is known to allow 
for cross-country comparisons in the presence of high heterogeneity. Income is 
defined as equivalent total gross household income, adjusted for 2004 
purchasing power parity.. 
 
Respondents are asked whether their child lives in the same household, 
in the same building, less than 1 km away, between 1 and 5 km, 5 and 25 
km, 25 and 100 km, 100 and 500 km, more than 500 km away or more 
than 500 km away in another country. We calculate an indicator of 
distance between the respondent and the nearest child, assigning each 
observation the number of kilometres corresponding to half the 
bandwidth of each possible category. The average distance from the 
nearest child is about 40 kilometres. This kind of measure, used also in 
Greene (1983) and Bonsang (2009), is usually assumed to be an 
important driver of informal care since children who live farther away 
would be less keen to provide support as compared to those living 
closer.   
6 A dummy indicator for the presence of limitations in instrumental activities 
of daily living (IADL) was finally excluded because of collinearity with the 
GALI indicators. 
7 Due to the nature of the data in use, however, we are not able to 
distinguish among adult children caregivers and non-caregivers, and this may 
lead to neglecting differences in the quality of care.  
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Finally, a few studies look at the role of LTC insurance and find that 
modest effects in the demand of formal care (Van Houvten and Norton, 
2004; Charles and Sevak, 2005; Li and Jensen, 2011). In our sample 11% 
of respondents have some general voluntary, supplementary or private 
health insurance in order to complement the coverage offered by their 
National Health System for LTC services. Those who only have an 
insurance for nursing care at home in case of chronic disease or disability 
are about 8%; while those who have an insurance for domestic help for 
activities of daily living are about 4%.  
 
3 Empirical strategy 
When modelling the overall process of formal and informal care use, 
simultaneous equation models allowing for reverse causation have 
seldom been used. Greene (1983) proposes a two-equation model for 
levels of formal and informal support and estimate a non recursive 
model using three-stage least squares to allow for the interrelation 
between the two endogenous dependent variables.  More often, 
reciprocal interaction between types of LTC has not been considered. 
Most of the existing studies estimate recursive simultaneous equation 
models that focus on the formal care process only and use instrumental 
variable approaches to identify the effect of informal support on formal 
care, thus relying on the availability of valid instruments (e.g. Lo Sasso 
and Johnson, 2002; Van Houtven and Norton 2004, 2008; Charles and 
Sevak, 2005; Bolin et al., 2008). 
Recursive models are obtained by setting an exclusion restriction in 
one equation of the system for one of the endogenous variables, yielding 
a triangular system specification. Only if this restriction is totally 
supported by the economic intuition (e.g. feedback effects can be ruled 
out), then the equation without the endogenous variable can also be 
interpreted as a structural form, otherwise it is better intended as a 
reduced form (or “auxiliary” regression). In the specific case of LTC, it 
seems unlikely that the quantity of formal care used does not affect the 
probability of receiving informal care as well as the actual amount 
received. Therefore, the estimation of recursive models would only imply 
a reduced form equation for informal care. This lessens the need for 
informational requirements (i.e., informal care is completely determined 
by exogenous variables), but the downside of this is that appropriate 
modelling of informal care use is missing. Consequently, a specific focus 
on the determinants of informal care use is not possible and 
investigation of the genuine relationship between interrelated types of 
LTC is neglected. In light of this, both recursive and non recursive 
specifications, meaning fully simultaneous equation system where a 
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structural form equation is specified also for informal care, will be 
considered in the following. 
Similarly to previous studies, we use a standard two-part model 
(Cragg, 1971; Duan, 1983; Jones, 2000), which specifies the probability 
of receiving care and the quantity of care received as two different 
processes, for both formal and informal care.8
3.1 A joint model for formal and informal care 
 Our contribution is to 
propose a unifying empirical framework to estimate jointly both 
processes. This takes the form of a bivariate two-part model that, in 
practice, is a system of four simultaneous equations with correlated error 
terms.  
The first component of the two-part model represents a hurdle to 
utilization and describes the probability of observing a positive number 
of hours of care, yF(I) (where F and I stand for the alternatives of formal 
and informal care respectively), conditional on a vector of exogenous 
regressors, xF(I),  and the endogenous indicator of the amount of informal 
or formal care received, yI(F). This is modelled using a probit functional 
form for the conditional probability: 
 
)''(),|0Pr( )()()()()()()( FIIFIFIFFIIFIF yxyxy γβ +Φ=>      (1) 
 
The second component is the conditional density for yF(I) given that 
the respondent receives some care. To ensure positive values of the 
quantity of care, and following several examples in the recent literature 
(e.g., Manning and Mullay, 2005; Deb Trivedi and Zimmer, 2009), this 
density is specified as a gamma function with two parameters:  
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where )''exp( )()()()( FIIFIFIF ygxb +=σ is the scale of the gamma 
distribution and α is the shape parameter. In the absence of precise 
indications from the underlying economic theory, we specify both 
                                                 
8 A prominent characteristic of measures of formal and informal care is that 
they can exhibit a substantial number of zeros: in our SHARE sample, zeros 
count for about 79% for TFC, 83% for PDH, 91 % for NC and 61% for IC. 
Two-part models are appropriate to account for this feature of the data.  
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components of each two-part model as identical in terms of exogenous 
explanatory variables. Vectors xF and xI therefore include covariates such 
as gender, age classes, PtD, household income (in logs), the number of 
years of education, disability and morbidity indicators, distance from the 
nearest child, health insurance indicators and country dummy variables. 
The first part is estimated on the whole sample; the second part is 
estimated only on the sub-sample of individuals who receive some care.  
We are interested in the (unconditional) expected number of hours of 
care received yielded by the two components of the model: 
 
αγβ )''exp()''()|( )()()()()()()()()()( FIIFIFIFFIIFIFIFIFIF ygxbyxxyE +⋅+Φ=  (3) 
 
where the second term of the product is the conditional expected 
number of hours, σα  )0|( )()( =>IFIF yyE , derived from the gamma 
distribution. 
Recursive systems of equations suggest a unidirectional causal 
relationship among dependent variables, thus ruling out the presence of 
direct effects of formal care on informal care (i.e., 0=Fγ  and 
0=Fg ). Relaxing this assumption, which means that there is not an a 
priori ordering in causation, is important for the understanding of the 
whole process of home care provision but makes the identification of 
the model more difficult.  
The expected number of hours of formal and informal care described 
in equations (3) could be estimated using separate two-part regression 
models. Here we consider that formal and informal care are interrelated 
components of the overall demand for LTC and, in view of that, 
estimate them jointly as a bivariate two-part model. This takes the form 
of a fully simultaneous system of four equations linked by dependence 
on common unobservables. The econometric issue in the estimation of 
the system is the endogeneity arising from the omission, in each 
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equation, of unobservables correlated to the observed component of the 
model. 9
In the presence of unobservable heterogeneity, the likelihood 
function of the joint model is analytically intractable within a standard 
ML optimization problem, thus requiring an appropriate estimation 
approach. A solution is offered by discrete latent factor models (DLFM) 
that specify the errors structure using discrete distributions, thus giving 
an additive form to the likelihood function and allowing for standard 
full-information maximum likelihood estimation. Such approach is based 
on a semiparametric technique introduced in the literature by Heckman 
and Singer (1984) and Mroz (1999), and has the advantage of avoiding 
any parametric assumption on the distribution of the unobservable 
heterogeneity, thus providing an alternative to parametric approaches 
such as maximum simulated likelihood or Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
DLFM have also been shown to reduce the bias in identification of the 
distribution of the latent factors when they are non-normal and to 
perform well in the presence of weak instruments (Mroz, 1999). Recent 
applications of the discrete factor model to labour and health care data 
can be found also in Bray (2005), Fabbri and Monfardini (2009), Lien et 
al (2010), Picone et al. (2003), van Ours and Williams (2011). 
  
3.2 Estimation method 
One way to estimate the joint model of formal and informal care taking 
into account the interdependence between the two processes is to 
assume that the error structure depends on common latent factors 
affecting each component of the model, that is the probabilities of 
receiving formal and informal care as well as the amount of care 
received. Therefore, we can write outcomes Y in terms of latent factors 
as: 
1)(J1)(FF)(J1)(J1)(JY ××××× Ω++= LPM         (4) 
                                                 
9 Previous works on HCE have highlighted the importance of accounting 
for potential endogeneity of PtD, since remaining life expectancy might be 
influenced by current total HCE (e.g., Zweifel, Felder and Werblow, 2004; 
Felder, Werblow and Zweifel, 2010). Note that is a minor issue in the analysis of 
LTC at home, given that formal and informal care can only have a secondary 
effect on remaining lifespan compared to medical care provided in hospitals or 
in nursing homes (e.g., De Meijer et al. 2011). A similar argument applies to 
potential endogeneity of disability indicators.  
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where M is a vector of means, L is a vector of latent factors with 
associated matrix of factor-loadings P, Ω is a vector of the idiosyncratic 
error components assumed to be mutually independent and independent 
of outcomes, covariates and latent factors. J is the number of equations 
in the joint model (J=4 in our case) and F is the number of mutually 
independent factors. 
As proposed in Balia and Jones (2011), we define the overall error 
terms in each equation ( jε ) as composite errors:  
 
4,...,1            . =++=+= jvul jjjjjj ωδρωε       (5) 
 
In the above equation, the lj are the elements of the matrix product 
1)(FF)(J ×× LP  and consist of two factors u and v - therefore F=2 in 
equation (4) - and the ωj are the elements of the vector Ω, whilst the 
additive random factors u and v are Bernoulli random variables, which 
take value 1 respectively with probability up  and vp , and value 0 with 
probability )1( up−  and )1( vp− . Their effect on the outcomes is 
allowed to vary thanks to equation-specific factor loadings ρj and δj. 
Probabilities up  and vp , are estimated by means of a logistic 
distribution: 
h
h
e
eph θ
θ
+
=
1
, where ., vuh =  The θh are additional 
parameters to be estimated together with the factor-loadings ),( jj δρ and 
other parameters of the model.10
The DLFM is based on a finite density estimator that approximates 
the unknown distribution of lj by using a step function based on K 
location mass points: 
  
( ) ,Pr kkjl πη ==  0≥kπ  11 =∑ =
K
k k
π     (6) 
where πk are the probabilities that the latent factor realises in a specific 
mass point. It follows that the individual contribution to the sample 
likelihood for bivariate two-part model using the DLFM is given by:  
)(
1
⋅= ∑ = k
K
k ki
fL π
                                                          
(7) 
where fk is a 4-dimensional density function. As shown by the above 
equation, the DLFM is a special case of the finite mixture model where 
                                                 
10 It turns out that ( ) ( ) ( )ueppu uu θ+=−= 111Var  and 
( ) ( ) ( )veppv vv θ+=−= 111Var . 
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only the intercepts vary and maximum likelihood estimation is carried 
out over a weighted sum of K densities, where the weights are the mixing 
probabilities. In our factor-loading specification, K=4 as the number of 
all possible combinations of u and v: 0=jl with probability 
)1)(1()0,0Pr(1 vu ppvu −−====π ; jjl ρ=  with probability 
)1()0,1Pr(2 vu ppvu −====π ; jjl δ=  with probability 
vu ppvu )1()1,0Pr(3 −====π ; and jjjl δρ +=  with 
probability vu ppvu ==== )1,1Pr(4π . The definition of the 
number of mass points and the mixing probabilities depends on the 
assumption that u and v are Bernoulli random variables. This allows us to 
achieve identification of the parameters of the distribution of lj through 
restriction of the range of mass points as well as easily recovering mixing 
probabilities from the moments of u and v.11
Equation (7) can be expressed in terms of summations over u and v: 
  
( )( )[ ]{ 00 ,33,11
1
0
1
0
),|0Pr(1),,|0Pr(1)1()1(
IF yyFIIIFF
v
v
v
v
u
u
u v
u
ui vuyxyvuyxyppppL δρδρ +>−+>−−−=∑∑
= =
 
( )[ ] 0,332211 ),,|0Pr(1),,,0|(),,|0Pr( IF yyFIIIFFFIFF vuyxyvuyxyyfvuyxy ++>−+>+>× δρδρδρ
 
( )[ ] ++>+>+>−×
IF yyFIIIFIIIFF
vuyxyyfvuyxyvuyxy ,443311 0),,,0|(),,|0Pr(),,|0Pr(1 δρδρδρ
         (8) 
[ ⋅+>+>× ),,,0|(),,|0Pr( 2211 vuyxyyfvuyxy IFFFIFF δρδρ  ] }+++>+>⋅
IF yyFIIIFII
vuyxyyfvuyxy ,4433 ),,,0|(),,|0Pr( δρδρ
 
 
 
A specific advantage of the assumption of Bernoulli latent factors for 
the present study is that it nicely matches with the economic framework 
of our model, since u and v can be interpreted as omitted dummies 
detecting a differential unobservable preference respectively for formal 
and informal care. It follows that classes (or types) in our population can 
be defined on the basis of possible combinations of u and v: a baseline 
type with no differential preferences for neither formal nor informal care 
(u=0, v=0); two types characterized by a differential preference for one 
                                                 
11 The distribution of the latent factors is not identified without further 
assumptions (Mroz, 1999). The location of lj is arbitrary when each equation has 
an intercept, and the scale of lj is also indeterminate. Therefore, identification 
requires a normalization that implies restricting the support of lj. 
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type of care only (u=1, v=0 for formal care, for example, and u=0, v=1 
for informal care); a type where both differential preferences are in place 
(u=1 and v=1). 
 
3.3 Identification of non recursive systems with discrete latent factor models 
In DLFM, identification relies on the fact that the structure of the error 
process specified in equation (5) allows for correlations between 
equations and captures the effect of unobservable heterogeneity. In fact, 
factor loadings estimates can be interpreted as coefficients of the omitted 
variables. As outlined by Bray (2005), the DLFM controls for 
endogeneity since the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, 
which is at the heart of the endogeneity bias, is approximated with a 
multivariate discrete distribution. Identification arises from non linearity 
in the functional form. Functional form assumptions, however, are 
usually considered untestable (see e.g., Van Ours and Williams, 2011a).  
Nevertheless, some recent studies argue that robustness of ML 
identification in latent factor models may be reinforced when specific 
conditions on the error distribution hold. In particular, Lewbel (2011) 
shows that in latent factor models identification of triangular and fully 
simultaneous linear equation systems can be ensured by exploiting the 
heteroscedasticity of the error term (εj) and, as a moment condition, the 
covariance restriction (implicit in factor models) that regressors are 
uncorrelated with the product of equation-specific error terms.12 In a 
time series framework, the idea of exploiting heteroscedasticity of the 
unobservables, as modelled by the factor structure, for identification of 
structural equation systems without invoking traditional exclusion 
restrictions was previously suggested by Sentana and Fiorentini (2001) 
and Rigobon (2003). More recently, Bacchiocchi (2011) has studied 
identification conditions within a FIML framework. Intuitively, allowing 
for clusters of heteroscedasticity amounts to increasing the number of 
equations in a system of homogeneous equations. In our case, we allow 
for clusters of heteroscedasticity in the residuals through the K location 
mass points entailed by the DLFM estimator.13
                                                 
12 Verifying this orthogonality condition in latent factor models is trivial 
given the independence hypotheses made on 
  
L  and Ω . 
13 A rigorous extension of these results to our DLFM is beyond the scope of 
the present paper. In particular, such results apply to factor models where 
endogenous variables enter linearly. In our model, however, though non linear, 
the system consists of single index models, for which the same full rank 
assumptions of linear regression models may be sufficient (e.g., Greene, 2008, 
ch. 14). 
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Exploiting such latent clusters of heteroscedasticity for 
identification removes the need to impose a recursive structure of the 
simultaneous equations system, thus ruling out direct effects of formal 
home care on informal support utilisation. Nonetheless, use of 
instrumental variables (i.e. relying on the imposition of exclusion 
restrictions) would help identification, provided that economic theory 
can support the assumption that some covariates directly affect informal 
care but not formal care, and vice versa. Following the existing literature, 
indicators of geographical distance between the elderly and their children 
could be excluded from the formal care equation, as they are assumed to 
directly affect only informal support.14 However, at a closer inspection, 
economic conditions to ensure validity might actually be rather strong. 
In particular: i) children’s location decisions should be independent of 
their parents’ health status; ii) children’s location decisions should be 
independent of the availability of formal care services in the area where 
their parents live;15
When the a-priori on instruments are weak, instead of excluding these 
variables from one equation, in accordance to the approach of the 
abovementioned paper by Lewbel (2011) our preferred strategy for 
identification is to keep them as regressors in both equations. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and comparison purposes, in 
the next section we will present results from models with and without 
exclusion restrictions. 
 iii) location decisions of needy parents should be 
independent of their own health status as well as availability of formal 
care services. Finding a valid exclusion restriction for formal care is even 
more difficult, given that so far this issue has not been considered. In 
our dataset, a possible candidate is represented by a set of binary 
indicators on LTC insurance, which in principle should directly influence 
formal care use only. The drawback of such indicators is that they do not 
ensure enough variability in the sample. 
                                                 
14 For studies with the SHARE database, see Bonsang (2009) and Bolin et al. 
(2008). By considering different subsamples, possible instruments for informal 
care could be also the number of children and the age of the oldest child. These 
variables were however disregarded in the preliminary stages of this work due to 
their lack of statistical significance.  
15 See Rainer and Siedler (2009) for a theoretical model of the location and 
employment decisions of adult children conditional their long-term family 
caregiving responsibilities and an empirical application with the German Socio-
Economic Panel survey. 
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4 Results  
We start this section by presenting the main results from the estimation 
of the DLFM for different specifications of the bivariate two-part model 
for TFC and IC. Table 2 and Table 3 report full results from the 
recursive (triangular) model and the non recursive (fully simultaneous) 
model, respectively.16
Table 2 reports point estimates from a “standard” triangular 
simultaneous equations system where IC appears in the right-hand side 
of the TFC equations whilst effects of TFC are ruled out from the 
informal care equations. In the first specification of the model (Model I) 
identification relies on the use of at least one instrumental variable for 
IC. As anticipated, we use as instrument an indicator of geographical 
distance between the dependent elderly and the nearest child.
  
17 In the 
second specification of the model (Model II) the indicator of distance is 
included also in the TFC equations, so that identification simply relies on 
the triangular structure of the joint model and on non linearity of the 
functional form of each equation.18
                                                 
16 The bottom panel of each table reports point estimates of the additional 
parameters that define the distribution of the unobservable heterogeneity. We 
have computed a test of equality of factor loadings 
 Relaxing the exclusion restriction in 
the recursive model determines only minor changes in the size and 
significance of estimated coefficients. The coefficient of IC has negative 
sign in both TFC equations only in Model I, but its value is essentially 
zero; it remains very close to zero and loses significance in Model II. 
PtD has a positive and significant effect on the number of hours of both 
TFC and IC in Model I. This is confirmed in Model II, although 
significance keeps holding only on hours of IC. In both specifications, 
age indicators are highly significant and display a much stronger positive 
effect on TFC than on IC. As expected, the coefficients of disability 
indicators (ADL, mobility and GALI) and long-term illnesses generally 
);;;( 43432121 δδρρδδρρ ====  in the components of each two-part model 
for the recursive as well as the non recursive specifications, always rejecting the 
hypothesis that latent factors affect both components in the same way.  
17 In preliminary versions of this study, we have used a more general set of 
children-related variables, such as children’s gender, marital status, employment 
status and age, to build indicators for the proportion of daughters, the 
proportion of unemployed children, the age of the youngest child and for 
whether the child lives with a spouse or not. They have been disregarded due to 
their generally low statistical significance. All the results presented are 
unaffected by their inclusion/exclusion in the analysis. 
18 Note that the effect of the distance variable is statistically significant, and 
the sign is the expected one. 
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show high statistical significance and both the probability of use and the 
amount of care increase as severity in disabilities are higher.  
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
What happens if we model the whole process of home LTC as a fully 
simultaneous equation system? In Model I of Table 3, the identification 
approach is based on exclusion restrictions. As discussed in the previous 
section, in addition to the usual indicator of distance as instrument for 
IC, an admissible candidate as an instrument for TFC is a binary 
indicator of LTC insurance. While distance is proved to be a significant 
determinant of IC, LTC insurance is not a statistically significant 
regressor in the TFC equations. Once exclusions restrictions are relaxed, 
coefficients of the endogenous regressors (hours of IC and hours of 
TFC) are unchanged. The effects are negative and significant on both 
components of the two-part models for IC and TFC, but very close to 
zero. The other coefficients and their associated standard errors change 
only at the third digit after decimal point.  
 
-Table 3 about here- 
 
We further compare the four previous specifications by looking at 
variations in the expected unconditional number of hours of formal and 
informal care yielded by variations in the main drivers of home LTC (i.e., 
age classes, PtD and indicators of severe disability). In view of that, we 
estimate average partial effects (APEs). For each individual, partial 
effects are computed as the change in the expected outcome resulting 
from a single unit change in the explanatory variable, as yielded by the 
two-part model specified in equation 3, then averaged across the whole 
sample, so that they are referred to the entire population. Partial effects 
are calculated by hand using the finite difference method.19
                                                 
19 In a DLFM, the estimation of the APEs has some technical 
complications: calculation of the expected outcome is obtained as a weighted 
average of the outcome calculated at each mass point of the unobservable 
heterogeneity distribution. This implies taking into account K outcomes arising 
from equations with K different intercepts. Weights are the estimated mixing 
probabilities. Significance level depends on estimated regression coefficients.  
 Table 4 
largely indicates robustness of the DLFM estimates to alternative 
specifications, with the exception of the recursive specification without 
exclusion restrictions. Overall, the other three specifications show quite 
large APEs for PtD and age. Being close to death determines an increase 
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of 7.4 - 8.8 hours per month in expected TFC and of 13.2 and 14.5 
hours in expected IC. Also the APEs of age classes are higher on 
expected IC. Being 75-85 years old has a smaller effect than PtD on care 
use. It augments TFC and IC of about 4.6 - 4.9 hours and 6.2 - 6.4 
hours, respectively. Being in the group of the oldest old determines an 
even higher increase in LTC use (about 13.3 - 17.3 hours for TFC and 
19.8 - 21.9 hours for IC). The effect of having severe disabilities can be 
even larger: an increment of more than 32 hours of TFC is associated 
with severe ADL, while severe limitations in mobility determine an 
increase of more than 18 hours of IC. Finally, the table shows evidence 
of slight substitutability between formal and informal care. One 
additional hour of informal care leads, however, to a reduction of about 
3 minutes in expected TFC use. Similarly one additional hour of TFC 
reduces IC use of about 6 minutes.  
 
-Table 4 about here- 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, we feel confident in choosing the 
most general specification yielded by the fully simultaneous system 
without exclusion restrictions for the estimation of two separate bivariate 
two-part models for PDH and NC. Regression results are reported in 
Table 5, whilst the whole set of APEs is contained in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. The estimated relationship between formal and informal care 
can be very different once we distinguish between types of formal care. 
A significant substitution effect is found when estimating the model for 
PDH and IC, though only in the second component of the two-part 
models. In the model for NC, the positive sign of coefficients indicate 
the prevalence of complementarity effects: in this case, coefficients are 
statistically significant only in the first component of the two-part model. 
NC is known to be the most costly type of home LTC and the absence 
of substitutability effects clearly frustrates some simplistic views 
according to which informal care would significantly contribute to 
reducing the future burden of LTC expenditures.20
                                                 
20 In line with Sloan and Norton (1997), Mellor (2001) and Courbage and 
Roudaut (2008), this result also undermines a necessary condition of the so-
called intra-family moral hazard hypothesis, which is often invoked to explain 
the lack of systematic purchasing of LTC insurance. Brau and Lippi Bruni 
(2008) reach a similar conclusion in an application of stated preference 
approaches to the demand for LTC insurance. 
 Overall, our results 
show evidence of moving from substitution to complementarity between 
formal and informal care as more professional and skilled services are 
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needed. The associated APEs, however, are again extremely small (at 
maximum, they predict a positive change of about 21 minutes in IC for 
one additional hour of NC and a negative change of 7 minutes for one 
additional hour of PDH), thus suggesting that the “traditional” focus on 
substitutability vs. complementarity is of small empirical relevance.  
For both PDH and NC, the coefficients of the oldest old age class is 
significant and positive. Table A.1 shows that being older than 85 implies 
an increase of 5 hours of NC and 21 hours of IC, and an increase of 6 
hours of PDH and 18 hours of IC. Also the coefficients of PtD are 
positive and statistically significant in both parts of the models for PDH 
and IC. In fact, additional low-skilled home care assistance can be easily 
purchased in the market when approaching the end of life. By contrast, a 
less clear role of PtD emerges in the NC model, where significant 
positive effects are found only on the number of hours of NC and the 
likelihood to receive IC. This might be due either to the fact that NC 
services are subject to in-kind rationing by insurance coverage, or to the 
scarcity of professional caregivers in the market. Looking at APEs in 
Table A.1, we find that being close to death has a larger positive impact 
on the expected use of IC (11 hours in the NC model and 17.5 in the 
PDH model) than on the two types of formal care (1.4 hours on NC and 
4.7 hours on PDH).  
Disability indicators have a very high explanatory power in both 
PDH and NC models. ADL, GALI and mobility indicators are 
significant in the equations describing the probability of receiving PDH 
and the quantity of NC used, and a higher severity is associated with 
higher likelihood of receiving formal care and heavier use. Their role in 
the equations for IC is less univocal. While severe mobility limitations 
still capture the highest use of IC in both the PDH and NC model, 
moderate ADL captures the highest variation in the probability of 
receiving IC.  
The remaining control variables either do not show clear significant 
effects or are difficult to interpret. Lack of significant effects mainly 
applies to income. A priori, one could expect no effects from this 
variable since LTC is in most cases a necessary good driven by 
limitations in daily living. However, one could have expected also some 
positive supplemental effect on formal (e.g., by allowing an easier access 
to private market services) as well as on informal care (e.g. by making 
bequest promises to informal caregivers more appealing). Results 
difficult to interpret are found for education and chronic disease in the 
case of the IC equation, where negative effects are found.  
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4.1 Using APEs to assess the relative importance of the main drivers of LTC  
We now evaluate the extent to which LTC use at home is affected by 
the interaction between ageing, PtD and disability. For each bivariate 
model (TFC, NC and PDH), we have calculated APEs of explanatory 
variables through simulations for different types of individuals for both 
the formal care and informal care equations. In Table 6, this enables us 
to show how APEs of age and IC on the expected number of hours of 
formal and informal care vary according to whether individuals are in 
proximity to death or not, and in response to different LTC needs as 
proxied by the severity of disability. This results in calculating the partial 
effects assuming that individuals are all in “low need” (with mild ADL, 
mobility and GALI), “high need” (with moderate ADL and mobility and 
severe GALI) or “very high need” (with severe ADL, mobility and 
GALI).21
The APE of IC on formal care slightly increases with needs and is 
doubled by PtD. This multiplicative effect, however, tend to decrease 
with higher needs. Interestingly, the ratio R around 2 confirms previous 
results covering a large set of HCE categories and other geographical 
areas found by Payne et al., 2007. As shown in the bottom panel of Table 
6, PtD has a similar multiplicative power on the APEs of TFC and PDH 
on IC calculated for the same needs types, with the exception of the 
APE of NC (R is between 1.1. and 1.3). This suggests that 
complementarity between NC and IC is poorly responsive to 
deterioration of health conditions as proxied by PtD. 
 For each need category we further compute the partial effects 
by setting that all individuals will either die (decedents) or survive 
(survivors). The reported ratio (R) between decedents and survivors 
measures the multiplicative power of PtD on the APEs.  
The APEs of age can reach very large values due to the combined 
effect of PtD and disability. As an example, moving from the group of 
“low need” survivors to the “very high needs” decedents in the TFC 
model, we observe a variation of more than 100 hours of formal care per 
month in the first age category, of which about 49 hours (55.12 minus 
6.10) attributed to variations in the disability level, and the remaining 52 
hours (107.38 minus 55.12) attributed to PtD. The variation can reach 
264 hours when considering the oldest old category. 
 
-Table 6 about here- 
 
                                                 
21 The latter category only represents 1.3% of our sample, but it is of interest 
because HCEs are typically concentrated in the most severe cases.  
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We further investigate the interactions between the main 
determinants of LTC, that is PtD, age and disability on formal care 
(Table 7) and informal care (Table 8), where APEs are simulated 
distinguishing between survivors and decedents, youngest and oldest old, 
individuals in different levels of need. Therefore, the ratios R are 
intended to measure the multiplicative power of PtD, age and disability 
separately. This analysis enables us to highlight a few interesting 
elements: i) individual ageing has a prominent role (the ratios R are in the 
range 5 – 9.4) in amplifying formal care, whilst its multiplicative effect is 
much smaller (1.6 – 3.2) on informal care use; ii) the multiplicative power 
of disabilities is always important, particularly when we consider the 
most severe situations (the ratios R often reach values above 7); iii) a 
strong interaction is found between “very high need” and PtD (about 71 
hours of additional TFC per month) and age (e.g., 152 hours of 
additional TFC per month); iv) combinations of age and PtD determine 
much smaller effects; v) the APEs of the disability indicators are usually 
more responsive to age than PtD (the largest variation in formal care is 
associated with ADL dummies, while the largest variations in informal 
care is associated with severe GALI and mobility).  
Overall, our results on the impact of ageing, PtD and disability draw a 
fairly complex picture where no dominant role for a single determinant 
emerges.  
 
-Table 8 about here- 
5 Conclusions  
The current debate on LTC has been developed along two main lines. 
One focuses on the residual impact of population ageing on 
expenditures’ growth when more precise indicators of health 
deterioration and needs such as PtD and disability are taken into 
account; the other focuses on the nature of the relationship between 
formal and informal care (complementarity vs. substitutability). These 
research issues are interconnected: in the case a significant substitution 
effect of informal support on formal care is found, then a valid policy 
instrument to control the evolution of LTC expenditure would be 
available.  
Within this research framework, this paper develops a unified 
empirical framework for the study of LTC. We explicitly model the 
overall process of formal and informal home care by means of a 
bivariate two-part model with correlated errors which specify both the 
probability and amount of the two types of care. By adopting a fully 
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simultaneous specification we estimate the reciprocal interaction between 
formal and informal care and evaluate the relative impact of age, PtD 
and disability. For the estimation of our bivariate two-part model we 
adopt a latent factor approach, thus making a step forward with respect 
to previous works based on recursive models for formal care where 
endogeneity of informal care was treated by means of instrumental 
variables approaches. 
Using data from SHARE and exploiting the longitudinal dimension 
of the survey to recover information on respondents’ living status, we 
find that age, PtD and disability should be jointly considered in models 
for utilisation of long-term home care. Estimation of separate models for 
TFC, PDH and NC provide evidence that disability and age play a more 
important role than PtD on both formal and informal care utilisation. 
The relevance of PtD varies according to the type of formal care 
considered: it is a strong significant explanatory variable in the model for 
PDH and IC, while it has a less clear role in the model for NC and IC.  
To better assess the contribution of age, PtD and disability, we 
present post-estimation predictions of changes in the expected number 
of hours of formal and informal care due to changes in explanatory 
variables for hypothetical individuals. The APEs of age and PtD are 
especially relevant if combined with disability. For example, when 
considering “very high need” individuals, the APEs of the oldest age 
category and PtD predict an increase of 152 and 71 hours per month in 
TFC, respectively. Overall, though non-negligible differences among the 
main drivers of LTC use emerge, we believe that age, PtD and disability 
should be used jointly as predictors of LTC use.  
Our analysis shows evidence of significant, though negligible, 
substitutability between formal care and IC when a general indicator of 
TFC is used. Estimated APEs suggest that a more intense use of one 
type of care generates a reduction of a few minutes only in the use of the 
other one. Focusing on PDH and NC separately, we find clear evidence 
of substitutability in the former case and of complementarity in the 
latter, perhaps because here more professional and skilled services are 
needed. Estimated APEs, however, are again extremely small, thus 
suggesting that the “traditional” focus on substitutability vs. 
complementarity is of small empirical relevance. In light of these findings 
we believe that emphasis should be placed not only on the sign of 
estimation results, but also on their size. Irrespective of whether a small 
substitution or complementarity effect is found, the policy implication is 
that incentives for informal support are not likely to strongly modify the 
demand of paid LTC home services in Europe. The role of informal care 
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as an effective cost-saving instrument to reduce the financial burden on 
public budgets for  paid LTC probably needs reconsideration. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 - Summary statistics 
Mean s.d.
share of LTC users 0.470 0.499
hours of LTCa 50.054 85.530
share of TFC usersa 0.441 0.497
share of NC usersb 0.444 0.498
share of PDH usersb 0.801 0.400
hours of TFCb 27.369 88.501
hours of NCc 13.718 38.269
hours of PDHd 26.549 89.993
share of IC usersa 0.830 0.376
hours of ICe 45.783 59.321
PtD 0.052 0.223
age 75.925 7.043
age 6575 0.448 0.497
age 7585 0.436 0.496
age over85 0.116 0.320
female 0.776 0.417
chronic no 0.117 0.321
chronic mild 0.281 0.450
chronic moderate 0.418 0.493
chronic severe 0.184 0.388
gali no 0.462 0.499
gali mild 0.351 0.477
gali severe 0.187 0.390
adl no 0.835 0.372
adl mild 0.091 0.287
adl moderate 0.060 0.237
adl severe 0.015 0.121
mobility no 0.320 0.467
mobility mild 0.307 0.461
mobility moderate 0.189 0.392
mobility severe 0.184 0.388
ltillness 0.572 0.495
income 66607 165000
education (years) 8.561 4.301
LTC insurance 0.114 0.318
NC  insurance 0.079 0.270
PDH insurance 0.038 0.192
distance nearest child 40.009 99.827  
Notes. a: means are calculated on LTC users only; b: means are calculated on TFC users only; c: means are calculated 
on NC users only; d: means are calculated on PDH users only; e: means are calculated on IC users only.
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TABLE 2 - Results from the Discrete Latent Factor estimation for Total Formal Care 
Variables
hIC -0.0002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.002) *** 0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002)
PtD 0.369 (0.232) 0.731 (0.302) ** 0.293 (0.190) 0.385 (0.196) ** 0.477 (0.313) 0.490 (0.302) 0.283 (0.183) 0.369 (0.196) *
age 7585 0.813 (0.155) *** 0.944 (0.217) *** 0.291 (0.091) *** 0.215 (0.120) * 1.081 (0.269) *** 0.773 (0.229) *** 0.279 (0.087) *** 0.216 (0.118) *
age over85 1.340 (0.239) *** 1.860 (0.332) *** 0.418 (0.145) *** 0.681 (0.163) *** 1.928 (0.546) *** 1.454 (0.301) *** 0.409 (0.138) *** 0.677 (0.162) ***
female -0.023 (0.140) -0.637 (0.191) *** 0.322 (0.106) *** -0.286 (0.161) * 0.000 (0.192) -0.515 (0.193) *** 0.321 (0.103) *** -0.290 (0.161) *
gali mild 0.457 (0.160) *** 0.575 (0.221) *** 0.220 (0.109) ** 0.136 (0.156) 0.610 (0.239) ** 0.378 (0.245) 0.206 (0.105) ** 0.131 (0.153)
gali severe 0.771 (0.206) *** 0.567 (0.291) * 0.375 (0.146) ** 0.631 (0.197) *** 1.046 (0.337) *** 0.165 (0.323) 0.360 (0.139) *** 0.623 (0.190) ***
adl mild 0.535 (0.186) *** 0.755 (0.261) *** 0.154 (0.148) 0.075 (0.172) 0.755 (0.287) *** 0.658 (0.249) *** 0.158 (0.141) 0.092 (0.167)
adl moderate 0.748 (0.233) *** 1.537 (0.280) *** 0.726 (0.195) *** 0.194 (0.184) 0.900 (0.314) *** 1.192 (0.274) *** 0.680 (0.187) *** 0.182 (0.181)
adl severe 1.566 (0.512) *** 2.121 (0.396) *** -0.103 (0.331) 0.376 (0.341) 2.102 (0.712) *** 1.998 (0.460) *** -0.069 (0.322) 0.366 (0.339)
mobility mild 0.758 (0.193) *** 0.843 (0.320) *** 0.514 (0.115) *** -0.001 (0.187) 1.062 (0.326) *** 0.756 (0.307) ** 0.494 (0.110) *** -0.016 (0.190)
mobility moderate 0.567 (0.213) *** 0.758 (0.333) ** 0.597 (0.140) *** 0.376 (0.200) * 0.777 (0.323) ** 0.810 (0.323) ** 0.581 (0.132) *** 0.384 (0.203) *
mobility severe 1.121 (0.253) *** 1.343 (0.391) *** 0.654 (0.167) *** 0.603 (0.221) *** 1.426 (0.366) *** 1.109 (0.351) *** 0.611 (0.157) *** 0.608 (0.223) ***
chronic mild 0.020 (0.250) 0.397 (0.395) 0.492 (0.169) *** -0.600 (0.293) ** -0.063 (0.340) 0.068 (0.392) 0.442 (0.160) *** -0.669 (0.304) **
chronic moderate 0.089 (0.241) 0.232 (0.363) 0.316 (0.165) * -0.594 (0.291) ** 0.038 (0.329) -0.131 (0.381) 0.268 (0.157) * -0.656 (0.302) **
chronic severe 0.516 (0.266) * 0.786 (0.368) ** 0.319 (0.185) * -0.622 (0.298) ** 0.662 (0.396) * 0.481 (0.398) 0.277 (0.177) -0.674 (0.312) **
ltillness 0.195 (0.147) 0.415 (0.205) ** 0.267 (0.104) ** -0.013 (0.142) 0.318 (0.220) 0.526 (0.217) ** 0.258 (0.099) *** -0.013 (0.142)
lnincome 0.030 (0.067) 0.048 (0.104) -0.011 (0.034) 0.002 (0.044) 0.060 (0.102) 0.033 (0.113) -0.008 (0.033) 0.001 (0.044)
education (years) 0.025 (0.016) 0.032 (0.022) -0.010 (0.012) -0.066 (0.015) *** 0.027 (0.022) 0.026 (0.022) -0.012 (0.011) -0.067 (0.015) ***
distance nearest child -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.002 (0.001) *** 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.002 (0.001) ***
intercept -4.832 (1.071) *** -0.775 (1.598) -0.497 (0.674) 6.206 (0.754) *** -7.112 (2.111) *** 1.862 (2.175) -0.118 (0.635) 6.396 (0.743) ***
α 1.190 (0.198) *** 0.972 (0.059) *** 0.818 (0.085) *** 0.967 (0.058) ***
Latent factor parameters
ρ 1 -0.679 (0.444) δ 1 1.291 (0.420) *** ρ 1 -0.710 (0.585) δ 1 2.463 (0.773) ***
ρ 2 -2.527 (0.365) *** δ 2 1.911 (0.275) *** ρ 2 -2.500 (0.398) *** δ 2 0.554 (0.690)
ρ 3 -1.339 (0.542) ** δ 3 0.800 (0.242) *** ρ 3 -1.505 (0.523) *** δ 3 0.477 (0.207) **
ρ 4 -1.940 (0.221) *** δ 4 0.045 (0.205) ρ 4 -1.955 (0.226) *** δ 4 -0.120 (0.218)
θ 1 3.002 (0.311) *** θ 2 -0.668 (0.371) * θ 1 3.145 (0.306) *** θ 2 -0.823 (0.443) *
logL
N 1337
Bivariate two-part model for Total Formal Care and Informal Care
Recursive Model I Recursive Model II
P(hTFC>0) E(hTFC|hTFC>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|hIC>0) P(hTFC>0) E(hTFC|hTFC>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|hIC>0)
-4554.611 -4553.000
1337  
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. 
In Model I "distance from the nearest child" is included only in the informal care equations to identify its effect on formal care; in Model II formal and informal care are 
regressed against the same covariates. All models also include country dummy variables. 
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TABLE 3 - Results from the Discrete Latent Factor estimation for Total Formal Care 
Variables
hIC -0.002 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002) *** -0.002 (0.002) -0.007 (0.002) ***
hTFC -0.003 (0.002) ** -0.005 (0.001) *** -0.003 (0.002) ** -0.005 (0.001) ***
PtD 0.374 (0.214) * 0.664 (0.280) ** 0.400 (0.236) * 0.483 (0.205) ** 0.370 (0.214) * 0.641 (0.279) ** 0.403 (0.238) * 0.463 (0.203) **
age 7585 0.738 (0.124) *** 0.834 (0.217) *** 0.360 (0.117) *** 0.302 (0.119) ** 0.737 (0.124) *** 0.830 (0.218) *** 0.359 (0.118) *** 0.297 (0.119) **
age over85 1.240 (0.181) *** 1.457 (0.303) *** 0.517 (0.186) *** 0.900 (0.174) *** 1.237 (0.181) *** 1.480 (0.289) *** 0.520 (0.187) *** 0.892 (0.173) ***
female 0.006 (0.129) -0.525 (0.194) *** 0.406 (0.132) *** -0.270 (0.157) * 0.002 (0.129) -0.512 (0.194) *** 0.405 (0.133) *** -0.273 (0.157) *
gali mild 0.416 (0.142) *** 0.414 (0.234) * 0.307 (0.136) ** 0.235 (0.142) * 0.415 (0.141) *** 0.425 (0.237) * 0.307 (0.137) ** 0.238 (0.142) *
gali severe 0.720 (0.177) *** 0.363 (0.282) 0.475 (0.182) *** 0.690 (0.177) *** 0.704 (0.178) *** 0.348 (0.293) 0.475 (0.185) ** 0.684 (0.176) ***
adl mild 0.486 (0.165) *** 0.673 (0.244) *** 0.155 (0.180) 0.192 (0.171) 0.487 (0.164) *** 0.671 (0.238) *** 0.159 (0.180) 0.187 (0.168)
adl moderate 0.686 (0.212) *** 1.258 (0.261) *** 0.852 (0.250) *** 0.360 (0.201) * 0.677 (0.213) *** 1.242 (0.262) *** 0.851 (0.254) *** 0.352 (0.202) *
adl severe 1.477 (0.485) *** 1.860 (0.396) *** 0.105 (0.439) 0.630 (0.349) * 1.490 (0.486) *** 1.871 (0.393) *** 0.093 (0.442) 0.598 (0.355) *
mobility mild 0.679 (0.159) *** 0.670 (0.297) ** 0.599 (0.141) *** 0.163 (0.170) 0.690 (0.160) *** 0.692 (0.298) ** 0.603 (0.142) *** 0.172 (0.170)
mobility moderate 0.570 (0.188) *** 0.778 (0.331) ** 0.771 (0.187) *** 0.625 (0.194) *** 0.595 (0.189) *** 0.826 (0.327) ** 0.782 (0.190) *** 0.635 (0.193) ***
mobility severe 1.080 (0.216) *** 1.234 (0.352) *** 0.885 (0.234) *** 0.911 (0.217) *** 1.100 (0.217) *** 1.263 (0.352) *** 0.887 (0.238) *** 0.919 (0.219) ***
chronic mild -0.045 (0.223) 0.059 (0.396) 0.604 (0.204) *** -0.374 (0.282) -0.050 (0.224) 0.054 (0.400) 0.597 (0.205) *** -0.392 (0.287)
chronic moderate 0.017 (0.215) -0.127 (0.389) 0.408 (0.196) ** -0.446 (0.276) 0.020 (0.215) -0.114 (0.393) 0.404 (0.197) ** -0.458 (0.279) *
chronic severe 0.407 (0.233) * 0.416 (0.411) 0.437 (0.225) * -0.346 (0.296) 0.406 (0.234) * 0.434 (0.412) 0.433 (0.226) * -0.350 (0.298)
ltillness 0.176 (0.131) 0.379 (0.207) * 0.290 (0.126) ** -0.005 (0.136) 0.176 (0.132) 0.392 (0.210) * 0.292 (0.127) ** -0.006 (0.136)
lnincome 0.030 (0.061) 0.069 (0.111) -0.006 (0.039) -0.001 (0.040) 0.027 (0.061) 0.071 (0.109) -0.006 (0.040) -0.002 (0.041)
education (years) 0.015 (0.015) 0.016 (0.023) -0.011 (0.014) -0.061 (0.015) *** 0.014 (0.015) 0.013 (0.023) -0.012 (0.014) -0.062 (0.015) ***
LTC insurance -0.030 (0.229) 0.198 (0.318) -0.041 (0.230) 0.212 (0.322) -0.147 (0.250) 0.115 (0.233)
distance nearest child -0.002 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) *** 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) ***
intercept -4.418 (0.833) *** 0.307 (1.607) -1.180 (0.798) 3.881 (0.678) *** -4.435 (0.832) *** 0.273 (1.573) -1.217 (0.810) 3.890 (0.682) ***
α 0.932 (0.100) *** 1.254 (0.124) *** 0.928 (0.100) *** 1.247 (0.125) ***
Latent factor parameters
ρ 1 -0.653 (0.354) * δ 1 0.949 (0.262) *** ρ 1 -0.643 (0.354) * δ 1 0.934 (0.265) ***
ρ 2 -2.464 (0.342) *** δ 2 1.361 (0.396) *** ρ 2 -2.482 (0.335) *** δ 2 1.342 (0.384) ***
ρ 3 -1.823 (0.543) *** δ 3 1.606 (0.373) *** ρ 3 -1.797 (0.536) *** δ 3 1.629 (0.395) ***
ρ 4 -2.142 (0.200) *** δ 4 1.810 (0.247) *** ρ 4 -2.126 (0.200) *** δ 4 1.817 (0.254) ***
θ 1 2.703 (0.256) *** θ 2 0.274 (0.285) θ 1 2.708 (0.260) *** θ 2 0.285 (0.292)
logL
N
-4549.706 -4548.385
1337 1337
Bivariate two-part model for Total Formal Care and Informal Care
E(hTFC|hTFC>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|hIC>0)
Non Recursive Model I Non Recursive Model II
P(hTFC>0) E(hTFC|hTFC>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|hIC>0) P(hTFC>0)
 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.  
In Model I "distance from the nearest child" is included only in the informal care equations to identify its effect on formal care and "LTC insurance" is included only in the 
formal care equations to identify its effect on informal care; in Model II formal and informal care are regressed against the same covariates. All models also include country 
dummy variables.  
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TABLE 4 - Comparison of Average Partial Effects  
APE E(hTFC) E(hIC) E(hTFC) E(hIC) E(hTFC) E(hIC) E(hTFC) E(hIC)
hIC -0.050 -0.010 -0.055 -0.054
hTFC -0.108 -0.102
PtD 8.803 13.221 4.753 12.870 7.572 14.505 7.386 13.819
age 7585 4.625 6.356 3.788 6.406 4.680 6.315 4.687 6.181
age over85 17.258 19.844 12.470 19.966 13.246 21.916 13.703 21.552
gali severe 5.266 17.418 2.694 17.360 4.039 15.565 3.936 15.231
adl severe 34.666 5.812 32.811 6.117 32.102 13.544 33.167 12.439
mobility severe 8.918 18.008 6.372 17.993 8.415 19.524 8.601 19.358
Recursive 
Model I
Recursive 
Model II
Non 
Recursive 
Model I
Non 
Recursive 
Model II
 
Notes. Model I is estimated with exclusion restrictions; Model II is estimated without exclusion restrictions. 
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Table 5 – Results from the Discrete Latent Factor estimation of the Bivariate two-part model for types of formal care 
Variables
hIC 0.004 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.002) ***
hPDH -0 0.002 * -0.01 0.001 ***
hNC 0.019 (0.010) * 0.003 (0.004)
PtD -0.176 (0.255) 0.862 (0.387) ** 0.383 (0.212) * 0.173 (0.229) 0.535 (0.223) ** 0.622 (0.246) ** 0.430 (0.226) * 0.561 (0.205) ***
age 7585 0.291 (0.139) ** -0.259 (0.202) 0.367 (0.111) *** -0.095 (0.138) 0.900 (0.149) *** 0.437 (0.229) * 0.337 (0.109) *** 0.258 (0.126) **
age over85 0.545 (0.198) *** 1.341 (0.269) *** 0.413 (0.168) ** 0.483 (0.199) ** 1.365 (0.207) *** 0.868 (0.267) *** 0.445 (0.173) *** 0.745 (0.179) ***
female 0.319 (0.167) * -0.400 (0.255) 0.410 (0.134) *** -0.578 (0.175) *** -0.098 (0.138) -0.416 (0.177) ** 0.387 (0.127) *** -0.269 (0.172)
gali mild 0.067 (0.172) -0.491 (0.276) * 0.227 (0.126) * -0.064 (0.162) 0.468 (0.157) *** 0.382 (0.222) * 0.268 (0.126) ** 0.174 (0.147)
gali severe 0.387 (0.194) ** -1.073 (0.277) *** 0.388 (0.165) ** 0.361 (0.208) * 0.766 (0.201) *** 0.477 (0.306) 0.459 (0.176) *** 0.691 (0.185) ***
adl mild 0.365 (0.184) ** 1.591 (0.237) *** 0.220 (0.168) -0.068 (0.223) 0.550 (0.171) *** 0.116 (0.198) 0.129 (0.166) 0.104 (0.169)
adl moderate 0.816 (0.213) *** 1.226 (0.250) *** 0.742 (0.211) *** -0.051 (0.208) 0.523 (0.220) ** 0.708 (0.292) ** 0.756 (0.241) *** 0.243 (0.208)
adl severe 1.395 (0.385) *** 2.068 (0.367) *** -0.171 (0.386) 0.572 (0.452) 1.037 (0.399) *** 1.650 (0.361) *** 0.162 (0.434) 0.700 (0.400) *
mobility mild 0.300 (0.189) 1.090 (0.294) *** 0.601 (0.147) *** -0.176 (0.199) 0.809 (0.190) *** 0.595 (0.323) * 0.569 (0.131) *** 0.126 (0.180)
mobility moderate 0.221 (0.219) 1.148 (0.321) *** 0.683 (0.171) *** -0.219 (0.223) 0.744 (0.220) *** 0.361 (0.332) 0.690 (0.167) *** 0.533 (0.207) **
mobility severe 0.471 (0.233) ** 1.323 (0.335) *** 0.728 (0.193) *** -0.001 (0.230) 1.107 (0.240) *** 0.686 (0.332) ** 0.746 (0.195) *** 0.829 (0.226) ***
chronic mild 0.113 (0.287) -0.874 (0.442) ** 0.545 (0.204) *** -0.782 (0.305) *** -0.153 (0.251) 0.025 (0.371) 0.526 (0.192) *** -0.489 (0.295) *
chronic moderate 0.121 (0.279) -0.724 (0.421) * 0.286 (0.200) -0.412 (0.304) 0.002 (0.240) -0.227 (0.349) 0.347 (0.184) * -0.499 (0.285) *
chronic severe 0.265 (0.297) -0.755 (0.436) * 0.333 (0.220) -0.447 (0.320) * 0.505 (0.258) * -0.077 (0.362) 0.339 (0.213) -0.523 (0.303) *
ltillness 0.281 (0.159) * 0.562 (0.236) ** 0.276 (0.120) ** 0.017 (0.151) 0.069 (0.144) 0.241 (0.189) 0.277 (0.118) ** -0.034 (0.140)
lnincome -0.025 (0.053) 0.297 (0.111) *** -0.001 (0.045) -0.034 (0.052) 0.081 (0.082) 0.014 (0.145) -0.005 (0.037) -0.001 (0.044)
education (years) 0.008 (0.016) 0.010 (0.022) -0.019 (0.014) -0.050 (0.016) *** 0.014 (0.017) -0.001 (0.027) -0.013 (0.013) -0.063 (0.016) ***
PDH insurance -0.298 (0.328) -0.756 (0.458) * 0.062 (0.268) -0.169 (0.274)
NC insurance 0.168 (0.221) -0.295 (0.285) -0.010 (0.248) 0.652 (0.327) **
distance nearest child 0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) *** 0.001 (0.001) ** -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) *** -0.002 (0.001) ***
intercept -2.917 (0.748) *** -2.275 (1.276) * -0.646 (0.772) 4.062 (0.789) *** -5.259 (1.116) *** 2.812 (2.164) -1.053 (0.801) 3.787 (1.169) **
α 1.890 (0.245) *** 1.149 (0.110) *** 1.380 (0.209) *** 1.165 (0.141) ***
Latent factor parameters
ρ 1 -0.235 (0.387) δ 1 -0.252 (0.222) ρ 1 -1.004 (0.422) ** δ 1 0.971 (0.402) **
ρ 2 -3.039 (0.196) *** δ 2 0.232 (0.316) ρ 2 -1.885 (0.284) *** δ 2 0.844 (0.740)
ρ 3 0.470 (0.452) δ 3 -1.791 (0.460) *** ρ 3 -1.812 (0.594) *** δ 3 1.430 (0.424) ***
ρ 4 0.177 (0.447) δ 4 1.723 (0.206) *** ρ 4 -1.982 (0.232) *** δ 4 1.999 (0.782) **
θ 1 1.433 (0.506) *** θ 2 1.335 (0.328) *** θ 1 2.761 (0.278) *** θ 2 0.777 (0.550)
logL
N 1337 1337
Bivariate two-part model for Paid Domestic Help and Informal CareBivariate two-part model for Nursing Care and Informal Care
P(hPDH>0) E(hPDH|hPDH>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|hIC>0)
Non Recursive Model IINon Recursive Model II
-4305.562-3683.142
P(hNC>0) E(hNC|hNC>0) P(hIC>0) E(hIC|IhC>0)
 
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.  
"PDH insurance" is included only in the model for Paid Domestic Help and Informal Care; "NC insurance" is included only in the model for Nursing Care and Informal Care. 
Both models include country dummy variables. 
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TABLE 6 – Average Partial Effects of formal and informal care and age on expected outcomes in 
hypothetical scenarios  
survivors decedents R survivors decedents R survivors decedents R
E(hTFC) -0.05 -0.12 2.3 -0.12 -0.26 2.2 -0.49 -0.98 2.0
E(hNC) 0.03 0.05 1.9 0.02 0.04 2.1 0.09 0.20 2.2
E(hPDH) -0.03 -0.07 2.5 -0.05 -0.13 2.4 -0.28 -0.60 2.2
E(hTFC) 6.10 13.94 2.3 13.83 30.07 2.2 55.12 107.38 1.9
E(hNC) 0.49 0.97 2.0 0.25 0.61 2.5 -0.55 -0.27 0.5
E(hPDH) 3.34 8.09 2.4 5.89 13.67 2.3 28.56 57.68 2.0
E(hTFC) 18.58 40.63 2.2 40.24 84.44 2.1 146.48 282.47 1.9
E(hNC) 15.32 28.15 1.8 14.09 27.97 2.0 70.60 151.89 2.2
E(hPDH) 8.40 19.47 2.3 14.53 32.54 2.2 66.97 133.65 2.0
hTFC E(hIC)TFC -0.07 -0.12 1.9 -0.27 -0.46 1.7 -0.38 -0.68 1.8
hNC E(hIC)NC 0.30 0.39 1.3 0.48 0.52 1.1 1.02 1.32 1.3
hPDH E(hIC)PDH -0.08 -0.16 2.1 -0.31 -0.59 1.9 -0.57 -1.13 2.0
E(hIC)TFC 4.55 8.24 1.8 17.26 28.62 1.7 25.65 44.71 1.7
E(hIC)NC 2.68 2.89 1.1 2.59 1.23 0.5 9.27 10.43 1.1
E(hIC)PDH 4.21 8.48 2.0 15.30 27.66 1.8 29.53 56.24 1.9
E(hIC)TFC 15.49 28.73 1.9 62.62 106.47 1.7 89.37 159.74 1.8
E(hIC)NC 18.53 25.95 1.4 36.31 46.10 1.3 60.75 86.27 1.4
E(hIC)PDH 12.22 25.52 2.1 48.27 90.82 1.9 88.58 175.61 2.0
APEs on formal care in each separate bivariate two-part model 
age 7585
age over85
low need high need very high need
hIC
age 7585
age over85
APEs on informal care in each separate bivariate two-part model 
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TABLE 7 – Selected Average Partial Effects on formal care in hypothetical scenarios 
APEs survivors decedents R
youngest 
old
oldest old R low need high need R
very high 
need
R
E(hTFC) -0.05 -0.10 2.2 -0.02 -0.12 7.6 -0.06 -0.13 2.2 -0.53 9.3
E(hNC) 0.01 0.02 2.0 0.01 0.03 6.6 0.03 0.02 0.8 0.09 3.4
E(hPDH) -0.02 -0.06 2.4 -0.01 -0.05 5.7 -0.03 -0.06 1.8 -0.30 9.3
E(hTFC) 2.34 16.50 7.1 8.88 19.20 2.2 71.50 8.1
E(hNC) 0.62 5.00 8.1 2.87 3.40 1.2 23.05 8.0
E(hPDH) 1.83 9.22 5.0 6.11 10.54 1.7 49.38 8.1
E(hTFC) 4.23 9.28 2.2 6.42 14.51 2.3 57.40 8.9
E(hNC) 0.09 0.19 2.2 0.50 0.25 0.5 -0.56 -1.1
E(hPDH) 2.10 5.16 2.5 3.56 6.25 1.8 30.09 8.5
E(hTFC) 12.47 26.63 2.1 19.50 42.10 2.2 152.43 7.8
E(hNC) 4.68 9.07 1.9 15.72 14.48 0.9 72.71 4.6
E(hPDH) 5.35 12.74 2.4 8.92 15.39 1.7 70.51 7.9
E(hTFC) 4.00 8.88 2.2 1.33 11.42 8.6
E(hNC) 3.12 5.72 1.8 1.66 14.18 8.5
E(hPDH) 1.17 2.67 2.3 0.53 2.69 5.1
E(hTFC) 10.12 22.41 2.2 3.42 28.80 8.4
E(hNC) 4.00 7.69 1.9 2.38 17.44 7.3
E(hPDH) 3.26 8.21 2.5 1.29 8.20 6.3
E(hTFC) 30.37 63.11 2.1 12.19 79.76 6.5
E(hNC) 18.25 36.77 2.0 12.00 75.33 6.3
E(hPDH) 15.69 37.72 2.4 6.91 37.74 5.5
E(hTFC) 3.15 6.75 2.1 1.03 7.89 7.7
E(hNC) -0.88 -1.71 1.9 -0.41 -3.22 7.9
E(hPDH) 1.58 3.88 2.5 0.60 3.72 6.2
E(hTFC) 3.49 7.17 2.1 1.29 8.45 6.6
E(hNC) -1.28 -2.45 1.9 -0.53 -4.57 8.6
E(hPDH) 2.61 6.17 2.4 1.09 5.97 5.5
E(hTFC) 2.77 6.15 2.2 0.86 7.64 8.9
E(hNC) 0.99 1.89 1.9 0.52 4.15 8.0
E(hPDH) 2.16 5.45 2.5 0.81 5.34 6.6
E(hTFC) 3.11 7.02 2.3 0.92 8.68 9.4
E(hNC) 0.94 1.79 1.9 0.48 3.93 8.2
E(hPDH) 1.43 3.56 2.5 0.54 3.50 6.5
E(hTFC) 7.58 16.49 2.2 2.53 20.47 8.1
E(hNC) 1.69 3.26 1.9 0.93 7.16 7.7
E(hPDH) 3.20 7.78 2.4 1.30 7.68 5.9
mobility severe
hIC
PtD
age 7585
age over85
adl mild
adl moderate
adl severe
gali mild
gali severe
mobility mild
mobility moderate
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TABLE 8 – Selected Average Partial Effects on formal care in hypothetical scenarios 
APEs survivors decedents R
youngest 
old
oldest old R low need
high 
need
R
very 
high R
hTFC E(hIC)TFC -0.09 -0.17 1.8 -0.06 -0.19 2.9 -0.07 -0.28 4.0 -0.41 5.7
hNC E(hIC)NC 0.34 0.45 1.3 0.31 0.58 1.9 0.31 0.48 1.6 1.04 3.4
hPDH E(hIC)PDH -0.11 -0.23 2.0 -0.08 -0.21 2.5 -0.08 -0.33 3.9 -0.61 7.2
E(hIC)TFC 8.87 25.28 2.8 10.10 37.40 3.7 56.20 5.6
E(hIC)NC 9.75 18.48 1.9 9.81 16.34 1.7 32.80 3.3
E(hIC)PDH 11.97 29.28 2.4 12.39 44.90 3.6 86.15 7.0
E(hIC)TFC 5.79 10.28 1.8 4.77 17.94 3.8 26.78 5.6
E(hIC)NC 3.01 3.47 1.2 2.71 2.50 0.9 9.39 3.5
E(hIC)PDH 5.56 11.03 2.0 4.47 16.05 3.6 31.13 7.0
E(hIC)TFC 20.11 36.51 1.8 16.27 65.24 4.0 93.53 5.7
E(hIC)NC 20.51 29.24 1.4 19.07 37.04 1.9 62.59 3.3
E(hIC)PDH 16.51 33.82 2.0 13.00 50.81 3.9 93.76 7.2
E(hIC)TFC 3.86 6.97 1.8 2.64 7.80 3.0
E(hIC)NC 1.68 1.78 1.1 1.68 2.62 1.6
E(hIC)PDH 2.49 4.94 2.0 1.86 4.59 2.5
E(hIC)TFC 13.21 21.87 1.7 9.61 25.33 2.6
E(hIC)NC 9.93 11.67 1.2 9.56 16.00 1.7
E(hIC)PDH 10.76 19.34 1.8 8.49 18.84 2.2
E(hIC)TFC 11.33 21.50 1.9 7.46 23.60 3.2
E(hIC)NC 11.86 18.92 1.6 9.55 21.83 2.3
E(hIC)PDH 15.25 32.49 2.1 10.97 29.14 2.7
E(hIC)TFC 4.57 8.17 1.8 3.10 9.10 2.9
E(hIC)NC 1.81 2.11 1.2 1.74 2.96 1.7
E(hIC)PDH 3.75 7.46 2.0 2.76 6.89 2.5
E(hIC)TFC 14.04 25.57 1.8 9.40 28.21 3.0
E(hIC)NC 15.51 21.99 1.4 13.47 27.16 2.0
E(hIC)PDH 14.81 30.50 2.1 10.75 27.62 2.6
E(hIC)TFC 4.12 7.24 1.8 2.89 8.33 2.9
E(hIC)NC 5.16 6.21 1.2 4.88 8.53 1.7
E(hIC)PDH 4.18 8.10 1.9 3.17 7.73 2.4
E(hIC)TFC 11.28 20.57 1.8 7.72 23.24 3.0
E(hIC)NC 5.39 6.28 1.2 5.18 8.80 1.7
E(hIC)PDH 10.35 21.21 2.0 7.65 19.60 2.6
E(hIC)TFC 17.94 32.84 1.8 12.27 37.03 3.0
E(hIC)NC 11.56 15.29 1.3 10.46 19.75 1.9
E(hIC)PDH 16.65 34.60 2.1 12.22 31.72 2.6
mobility severe
adl mild
adl moderate
adl severe
gali mild
gali severe
PtD
age 7585
age over85
mobility mild
mobility moderate
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Appendix 
Table A.1 – Average Partial Effects for three separate models for formal and informal care 
P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y) P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y) P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y) P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y) P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y) P(y>0) E(y|y>0) E(y)
hIC -0.0003 -0.087 -0.054 -0.0004 -0.067 -0.028 0.0004 0.017 0.009
hTFC/ hPDH/ hNC -0.001 -0.148 -0.102 -0.001 -0.190 -0.127 0.005 0.167 0.352
PtD 0.067 10.692 7.386 0.097 17.717 13.819 0.088 8.810 4.681 0.114 23.111 17.538 -0.018 13.884 1.413 0.101 11.261 11.181
age 7585 0.120 7.549 4.687 0.085 7.808 6.181 0.121 4.059 2.379 0.088 7.274 6.047 0.031 -2.053 0.093 0.094 -5.222 3.044
age over85 0.231 19.820 13.703 0.125 32.498 21.552 0.213 10.230 6.014 0.117 27.347 18.047 0.066 25.407 4.963 0.106 35.709 21.251
female 0.000 -7.796 -4.258 0.094 -9.526 -1.368 -0.014 -5.196 -1.986 0.098 -9.723 -1.011 0.033 -4.939 -0.080 0.101 -40.897 -8.122
gali mild 0.069 5.118 3.616 0.074 6.206 4.941 0.065 3.786 1.841 0.071 4.700 4.113 0.007 -7.125 -0.976 0.058 -3.482 1.834
gali severe 0.127 4.022 3.936 0.116 22.636 15.231 0.117 4.970 3.000 0.124 24.548 16.379 0.048 -12.085 -1.409 0.102 24.546 16.124
adl mild 0.092 7.357 4.437 0.038 5.841 4.195 0.090 1.070 1.285 0.034 3.305 2.740 0.045 27.714 3.351 0.058 -3.945 1.674
adl moderate 0.133 18.945 11.231 0.210 11.972 14.099 0.085 8.927 3.677 0.204 8.302 11.591 0.125 17.078 4.303 0.202 -2.966 10.049
adl severe 0.329 42.307 33.167 0.022 23.222 12.439 0.190 36.487 17.510 0.043 30.566 17.041 0.267 49.008 19.598 -0.042 46.003 12.585
mobility mild 0.108 5.209 3.171 0.145 3.461 4.411 0.102 5.553 2.546 0.150 2.800 4.529 0.031 8.343 1.082 0.150 -10.581 5.246
mobility moderate 0.090 6.699 3.585 0.191 16.423 12.161 0.092 2.974 1.672 0.184 14.638 11.346 0.022 9.096 1.030 0.173 -12.891 5.460
mobility severe 0.194 13.246 8.601 0.219 27.865 19.358 0.156 6.734 3.714 0.200 26.879 18.307 0.053 11.645 1.852 0.186 -0.044 11.907
chronic mild -0.008 0.654 0.195 0.138 -15.068 -1.997 -0.020 0.312 -0.271 0.134 -20.134 -4.186 0.012 -13.054 -1.540 0.136 -51.557 -10.725
chronic moderate 0.003 -1.276 -0.602 0.092 -17.100 -4.564 0.000 -2.512 -0.770 0.087 -20.427 -5.853 0.012 -11.549 -1.304 0.069 -32.101 -6.010
chronic severe 0.073 6.433 4.893 0.098 -13.727 -2.521 0.082 -0.918 0.892 0.084 -21.205 -6.331 0.029 -11.876 -1.094 0.080 -34.241 -6.137
ltillness 0.029 4.709 2.951 0.070 -0.183 2.214 0.010 2.543 0.954 0.073 -1.139 1.930 0.031 6.210 1.324 0.070 1.051 4.546
lnincome 0.003 0.291 0.190 -0.001 -0.026 -0.030 0.008 0.041 0.065 -0.001 -0.011 -0.021 -0.001 1.223 0.188 -0.0002 -0.995 -0.329
education (years) 0.002 0.175 0.137 -0.003 -1.939 -1.127 0.002 -0.011 0.026 -0.003 -2.012 -1.155 0.001 0.111 0.030 -0.005 -2.935 -1.421
LTC/ PDH/ NC insur. -0.007 3.066 1.544 -0.034 3.851 0.824 -0.040 -6.024 -2.298 0.016 -5.189 -2.231 0.020 -2.850 -0.188 -0.003 52.324 20.360
distance nearest child 0.000 0.008 0.006 -0.0003 -0.074 -0.051 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.068 -0.047 0.0001 0.030 0.005 -0.0004 -0.105 -0.064
sweden 0.170 -4.353 -0.598 -0.011 -23.873 -13.033 0.202 -12.177 -2.686 -0.011 -24.317 -12.846 -0.020 -0.181 -0.344 -0.007 -43.837 -17.437
denmark 0.367 -5.880 -0.580 -0.031 -11.642 -6.977 0.399 -11.899 -2.615 -0.026 -9.482 -5.616 0.107 13.517 5.546 -0.049 -11.506 -6.968
austria 0.135 18.290 14.785 -0.007 -8.743 -4.894 0.153 -8.675 -1.790 -0.010 -9.372 -5.137 0.024 115.635 26.621 -0.015 -19.442 -8.296
france 0.362 -2.660 2.196 -0.070 -14.339 -9.472 0.267 -7.100 -0.242 -0.099 -10.513 -8.274 0.183 1.512 3.563 -0.096 -21.227 -13.065
belgium 0.419 20.235 21.051 0.021 -1.917 -0.364 0.420 -5.116 2.446 0.017 -2.010 -0.495 0.153 21.307 9.289 -0.003 -7.103 -2.972
netherland 0.345 13.263 14.830 -0.003 -16.328 -8.811 0.410 -6.899 0.130 0.009 -14.673 -7.407 0.074 165.803 46.709 0.015 -26.828 -9.948
spain 0.213 10.661 10.577 -0.173 4.950 -4.334 0.269 -6.762 -0.556 -0.173 11.279 -2.297 -0.030 -11.248 -1.676 -0.175 40.937 -0.364
italy -0.021 2.396 0.892 -0.119 -2.828 -5.396 0.063 -5.087 -1.028 -0.115 1.040 -3.625 -0.076 -11.152 -1.699 -0.121 -1.693 -7.767
IC
Bivariate two part model for nursing care and 
informal care
Bivariate two part model for paid domestic help 
and informal care
TFC NCPDHIC
Bivariate two part model for total formal care and 
informal care
IC
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